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ABSTRACT
This paper examines intra-day patterns of the exchange rate behavior, using the “firm” bid-ask
quotes and transactions of USD-JPY and Euro-USD recorded in the electronic broking system of the
spot foreign exchange markets. The U-shape of intra-day activities (deals and price changes) and
return volatility is confirmed for Tokyo and London participants, but not for New York participants.
Activities and volatility do not increase toward the end of business hours in the New York market,
even on Fridays (ahead of weekend hours of non-trading). It is found that there exists a high positive
correlation between volatility and activities and a negative correlation between volatility and the
bid-ask spread. A negative correlation is observed between the number of deals and the width of
















The foreign exchange market remains sleepless.  Someone is trading somewhere all 
the time—24 hours a day, (almost) 7 days a week. Analyzing the behavior of the 
exchange rate has become a popular sport of international finance researchers, while 
global financial institutions are investing millions of dollars to build a real-time 
computer trading scheme. High-frequency, reliable data are the key in finding robust 
results for researchers or profitable schemes for businesses.   
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze intra-day patterns, or seasonality, of market 
activities—frequency of quote revisions, transaction volumes, volatility, and bid-ask 
spread—of the dollar/yen and the euro/dollar spot exchange rates using a newly 
available data of the electronic broking system for the spot foreign exchanges.
1 The 
intra-day seasonality is in itself interesting but it serves as a basis for further theoretical 
and empirical analysis.
2 Some of our findings will be confirmation of what has been 
established in the literature with less reliable data, and some results, concerning 
behavior of the bid-ask spread, are new.   
 
The overwhelming majority of the spot foreign exchanges are now transacted through 
the global electronic broking systems—the EBS and Reuters D3000. The data, provided 
by the EBS, consist of global electronic broking bid-ask quotes, lowest given and 
highest paid transaction prices, and transaction volumes for three years starting January 
01, 1999 at the frequency of every one minute.
3    The EBS data set has advantage over 
the frequently-used, indicative quotes of a foreign exchange market tick-by-tick data set, 
such as FXFX of Reuters, in at least two important aspects. First, the quotes in the EBS 
data set are “firm”, in that banks that post quotes are committed to trade at those quoted 
prices, when they are “hit”.
4  In contrast, the indicative quotes of FXFX screen are 
those input by dealers for information only, without any commitment for trade. 
Indicative quotes are much less reliable than firm quotes in capturing the whole picture 
of  market  reality.  Second,  transactions data available in the EBS data set is simply not 
                                                  
1 The EBS notations define the base currency as the first currency in the name of the currency pair. 
Note that trading in EBS is done in millions of the base currency. 
2 In an earlier paper of ours, Ito and Hashimoto (2004), we have analyzed intraday patterns without 
data set of trade volume shares, which will be described later.    This paper is a much expanded 
version of our earlier paper with an additional data set. Although most of the contents are absorbed 
in this paper, this is practically new paper. The earlier paper will remain unpublished. 
3 The data set was provided for fee by the EBS Co., for the use at the University of Tokyo, Graduate 
School of Economics. The authors are grateful to EBS for such an arrangement. 
4 See Goodhart and O’Hara (1997: p.78) for general discussions on the difference between the 
indicative and firm quotes. 
  2available in the FXFX screen. Although exact trading volumes are not disclosed, 
transactions counts (counts of seconds that had at least one transaction) and trade 
volume shares (a daily percentage share of trading volumes in one minute) are available 
in the EBS data set.   
 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is three-fold.    First, the paper presents a 
careful description of intra-day seasonality (quote revisions, trading volumes, volatility, 
and bid-ask spread), taking into account time zone and daylight saving time of major 
markets, and national holidays. Over different GMT hours, quote revision frequency, 
trading volume, and return volatility are found to move together whereas the spread 
moves the opposite way, most of the time. Second, the U-shape pattern of quote revision 
frequency and trading volume shares is found for both Tokyo and London participants, 
but no daily U-shape patterns for New York participants.    Effects of overlapping hours 
on price changes and transaction volumes seem to be large. Third, with regard to the 
intraday patterns of the bid-ask spread, the following tendencies were established for 
most hours during the day, except possibly the opening hour of the Tokyo market: a 
negative correlation between the number of deals and the width of bid-ask spread; the 
negative correlation between the bid-ask spread and price volatility. The discovery of 
the last correlation is interesting because it contrasts to an observed intra-day pattern in 
the equity market.   
 
In FOREX market, activity (quote revision and trading) and volatility are highest in 
ordinary opening hours of all three markets, but there is no increase at the end of the day.   
This contrasts to the equity markets where activity is U-shaped with a rise at the end of 
the day as well as at the beginning.  Another big difference between FOREX and 
equity markets is the correlation coefficient of the spread and activities (deals and price 
revisions).  The paper finds that the spread is narrower during the hours of high 
activities in the FOREX market, and this is opposite of the conventional wisdom of the 
equity markets. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:    Section 2 describes the data.    Section 3 
establishes intra-day seasonality of activities. In section 4, various econometric tests are 
conducted to confirm statistically the patterns. Section 5 examines the London and New 
York opening effects, that is the extent of higher activity at the opening business hours. 
In section 6, we construct a theoretical model to explain how the overlapping business 
hours enhance the inter-regional trade. Section 7 concludes the paper.   
  3 
2. The EBS data 
2.1. EBS electronic broking system 
By early 2000s, almost all major currency spot trading have become matched by one of 
the two electronic broking systems, EBS and Reuters D-3000.
5 The share of electronic 
trading is dramatically increasing and it should make researchers to reconsider how the 
theory should be formulated.
6 The EBS is a provider of trading technology, and the 
quotes and transactions are shown continuously, 24 hours a day. The EBS trader’s 
screen shows the “best bid” and the “best offer” of the market, that is, the bid and offer 
that are committed to trade by some dealer, and the “best bid for the dealer” and “best 
ask for the dealer”, that is, the bid and offer that are committed to trade if someone on 
the other side has credit line with you.
7   
 
The EBS has a very strong market share (in absolute terms and in comparison to 
Reuters D-3000) in the dollar/yen rate and the euro/dollar rate.
8 Therefore, it is safe to 
                                                  
5 The various aspects of market transactions are surveyed for the month of April every three years by 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) with cooperation with national central banks. The 
surveys by the Bank of Japan on the Tokyo market shows that the yen total transaction volume in 
Tokyo in April 2001 was 146.8 billion, of which 122.7 billion yen was in the interbank market, and 
24.1 billion yen was in the customer market. In the interbank market, 27.8 billion yen was spot 
trading, 10.7 billion yen was forward trading and 84.2 billion was swap trading.    Of the spot 
interbank transactions, about half (13.4 billion yen) was done via electronic broker, another half 
(13.0 billion yen) was through direct dealing. The human broker diminished to be a minor segment 
(1.4 billion yen) of the market. The ratio of electronic broking transactions to total interbank spot 
trading has increased from 12.0% (1995) to 36.7% (1998), to 48.3% (2001). The ratio of electronic 
broking transactions to total broking transactions increased from 32.1% (1995) to 79.3% (1998) to 
91.0% (2001). The Bank of Japan stopped the survey of the electronic trading in 2004.    The Bank 
of England in the April 2004 survey estimates 66 percent of the interdealer spot business in the UK 
is conducted through electronic broking, while it was 34 percent in New York. (Bank of England, 
2004, p.473).     
6 The BIS (2002) also mentions the impact of the widespread use of the electronic broker for the 
decline of the trading volumes from 1999 to 2001: “[decline in the transaction volume] can in part be 
explained by the growing role of electronic brokers in the spot interbank market. The use of 
electronic brokers implies that foreign exchange dealers generally need to trade less actively among 
themselves.” (BIS (2002: p.7).    “Trading among themselves” was described as “hot potatoes” 
(Lyons (1997)), which had become less important due to the electronic trading. Our interviews (in 
November 2003) with banks with substantial foreign exchange trading in London reveals that they 
have reduced in the last few years the degree of discretion of dealers and shifted proprietary trading 
to the specialized section.    Computer models have replaced dealers’ instincts. 
7    For the general reference on the microstructure of the foreign exchange market, see Goodhart and 
O’Hara (1997), Lyons (1995) and Lyons (2001). For earlier work that used the electronic broking 
system, see Goodhart, Ito and Payne (1996) and Goodhart and Payne (1996) have used the data 
obtained from Reuter D2000-2 that is predecessor of D3000. 
8 Reuters have significant market shares in exchanged related to sterling, Canadian dollar, and 
Australian dollars. 
  4assume that almost all electronically brokered spot deals of these two currencies are 
represented in the data set.   
 
The EBS system facilitates, as part of the dealing rules, each institution to control its 
credit lines: trading in EBS can be done only between counterparties with bilateral 
credit but an institution can control only its own credit lines. Namely, each EBS-linked 
institution sets credit lines (including zero) against all other potential counter-parties.
9 
Therefore, an institution faces a restriction of bid, offer, or deal from other institutions. 
When market-best bid and offer rates are posted, they are not necessarily available to a 
particular participant of the EBS system. For example, a smaller or regional bank may 
have fewer trading relationships, thus not as many credit relationships.   The 
EBS-registered dealer’s screen shows the best bid and best offer for that particular 
institution, as well as those of the market. The bid and ask for that institution may be 
different from the market-best bid and best ask of the market.    Our data set contain the 
market-best bids and offers.  In normal times, the market-best bid of the market is 
lower than the best offer of the market. However, it is possible, and it does happen, that 
market-best bid price and ask price is reversed.
10  The reversal does not necessarily 
mean the existence of risk-free profit opportunities. They may reflect that credit lines 
prevent the obvious arbitrage. We have eliminated such reversals from the sample. 
 
2.2. The EBS Data Set
11   
The EBS has made available to us two sets of data, the price data set and the trade 
volume share data set. Both data sets include information on the dollar/yen and the 
euro/dollar currency pairs from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001. The price data 
set is the first to become available to several researchers on the firm quotes in high 
frequency.
12  It contains information of, among others, best bid, best ask, deal prices 
                                                  
9 Also, as part of facilitating an orderly market, EBS requires any newly linked institution to secure a 
sufficient number of other banks that are willing to open credit lines with the new comer. 
10 This reversal may be caused by aggressive pricing (higher bids or lower asks) by smaller, local 
banks because they will have relatively fewer credit relationships, implying that they will see fewer 
dealable prices generally. 
11 The data set is a proprietary information of EBS. The usage is restricted to those who are affiliated 
at the University of Tokyo. 
12 Data are of the 1-second time slice. The system records, at every second, bid, offer, deals that are 
posted and carried out in the world-wide EBS system. The quote data (Bid and offer) are the best 
prices from the electronic order book recorded at the end of time slice. Fluctuations of the bid and 
offer rates within the second (in the time slice) are not recorded and cannot be inferred. It is 
theoretically possible that bid and offer rates move up and down within the second, but not shown in 
the data set. Deal rates are recorded on the basis of Highest Paid and Lowest Given in the 1-second 
time slice.   
  5done on the bid side (lowest given) and deal prices done on the ask side (highest 
paid).
13  Moreover, the EBS price history shows whether the deal is done on the bid 
side (the bid was taken) or the ask side. The price data set does not contain information 
on the volume of transactions associated with bid, offer, or deal.     
 
The basic characteristics of the data used in this study are shown in Table 1. “The 
number of price changes” means the number of quote changes on either side of the 





The trade volume data set is also the first to become available on the trading volumes in 
high-frequency. It includes relative trade volume shares that are the share of trade 
volumes (one-minute slice) relative to the total trading volumes in that day.
15  
 
The EBS global system consists of three regional computer sites, based in Tokyo, 
London, and New York, and it matches orders either within the site or across different 
sites. Each region covers Europe, North America, and Asia, respectively. The three 
regions are often abbreviated as LN, NY, and TY regions in this paper.  The 
intra-regional deal of LN, for example, consists of deals whose maker and taker are both 
from London region. And inter-regional deal of LN&NY consists of deals whose maker 
and taker are from two different regions of London and New York.   
 
A relative share of trades between dealers in region X and Y, where X and Y are one of 
the three regions, in minutes s is defined as those trading volumes (between X and Y in 
minutes s) divided by total trading volumes of that day.  Therefore for each minutes, 
there are six intra- or inter-regional trading shares are available. 
                                                  
13 The deal (on either side) recorded at xx second includes those that took place between xx-1 second 
to xx second.    When there are multiple trades within one second, “lowest given price” and “highest 
paid price” will be shown. A highest paid deal means the highest price hit (done) on the ask side 
within one second and the lowest given deal means the lowest price hit (done) on the bid side within 
one second. 
14 Price changes could be generated by new entries of quotes, withdrawal of former quotes or 
disappearance of the quote due to “hits”. The difference between “the number of price changes” and 
the sum of “the number of price changes on the bid side” and “that on the ask side” is the number of 
quote changes on both sides simultaneously. 
15 Since actual volumes in a second or a minute were not available, we use this relative measure.   
Admittedly, it is less informative. However, a picture of intra-day trading patterns using actual 
volumes may be only slightly different from ours.   
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Table 2 shows the three-year average of relative daily volume percentages of the 
yen-dollar and the euro-dollar deals. Deal traffic patterns are described in terms of 
intra-regional deals as well as inter-regional deals. The relative deal volume of six pairs 
of three markets is shown as percentage of the total daily volume by region. Originally 
the percentage is shown in the one-minute timeslice basis. Then, in the analysis, it is 
hourly aggregated.   
 
The first three rows show percentages of intra-regional deals of London, New York, and 
Tokyo.    The next three rows show the three inter-regional pairs of three regions.    The 
Relative Trade Share by region is the postulated share based on our calculation, in order 
to see the shares of deals that can be attributable to a particular region. It is calculated 
by adding the intra-regional deal share and the sum of halves of inter-regional deals.  
For example, the yen trade share in Tokyo market is the sum of the Tokyo intra-regional 
share, half of the Tokyo-NY, and the half of the Tokyo-London deal shares. In other 





There are two salient features that emerge from this table. First, there is a home-market 
advantage, namely the yen is traded more by Tokyo financial institutions (Tokyo-Tokyo 
deals, Tokyo-London deals, in particular) and the euro is traded more by London 
financial institutions (London-London deals, London-New York deals, in particular). In 
total, 42% of yen trades are attributable to the Tokyo financial institutions (30 % for 
London), and 54% of euro trades are attributable to the London financial institutions 
(14% for Tokyo).  The New York institutions participate in the deals less than the 
Tokyo institutions for the yen and less than London institutions for the euro transactions. 
Second, the overlapping business hours encourage inter-regional transactions. For both 
the yen and the euro, the London-New York deal share is the highest, and the 
Tokyo-New York deal share is the lowest.    This reflects that business hours in London 
and New York overlap more than three active business hours, while Tokyo and New 




  73.  The  Intra-day  Patterns 
3.1 The Literature 
The intraday patterns of volume, volatility, spread have been examined with data in the 
foreign exchange and stock markets theoretically and empirically by many papers.
16 A 
seminal work by Admati and Pfeiderer (1988) provided a theory to explain why the 
concentration of trading and high volatility could happen in particular hours in a day 
using the model where there are three types of traders, discretionary liquidity traders, 
non-discretionary liquidity traders, and informed traders. Among other findings, they 
related their theoretical results to the U-shape pattern of volume and variance observed 
in New York Stock Exchange.    We will argue later in this section of the paper that the 
high volume and variance at the end of the day is not observed, so that the U-shape is 
violated, in the foreign exchange market, unlike the stock market. Admati and Pfeiderer 
(1988) also predicted that the spreads should be lowest at the beginning of the day.  
Brock and Kleidon (1992) provides evidence that the bid-ask spread also shows the 
U-shape as volume, contradicting theoretical prediction of Admati and Pfeiderer.  
Hsieh and Kleidon (1996) presented the intra-day U-shape pattern of the bid-ask spread 
as well as the volatility of returns (mid point of the bid and ask quotes) of the Deutsche 
Mark/Dollar, namely they are positively correlated.  They used the identity of 
institutions that provide quotes to show the U-shape of standard deviation of returns 
(Fig. 2.3) and spreads (Fig. 2.5) for market participants of particular region. Easley and 
O’Hara (1992) built a theoretical model where a lack of trade would induce a market 
maker to narrow the spread in the next period.  This implies a positive correlation 
between the trading volume and the spread. 
 
In this section, we will present several pieces of evidence. Some of them confirm what 
were found in the literature, while some contradict the above-mentioned results or 
theoretical predictions. First, we will show that during the first hour of the Tokyo 
market (or practically first hour of active trading of the day), bid-ask spreads are wider, 
considering the high trading volume and return volatility. This is consistent with an 
adverse selection model of Foster and Viswanathan (1990) and the stock market 
evidence of Foster and Viswanathan (1993), but inconsistent with the Admati and 
Pfeiderer prediction. We will show that the spreads of market best quotes show a 
negative correlation with volatility and trading volume in general within the day, 
                                                  
16 Many papers are contained in a conference volume on the High Frequency Data in Finance, edited 
by Baillie and Dacorogna (1997).    Hsieh and Kleidon (1996) provide a concise survey on the 
literature with regard to the existence and explanation of the U-shape pattern in addition to their 
empirical findings. We summarize their survey of the literature up to the point of their publication. 
  8contradicting the stock market evidence, except the opening hour of the Tokyo market 
where the spread is wider considering the very high volume and volatility.   
 
When intra-daily data of indicative quotes became available, a large literature emerged 
examining the intraday patters of volatility and bid-ask spread.
17 Among others, 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1997, 1998) and Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) show the 
patterns of intraday volatility, including calendar effects, Daylight Saving Time, Tokyo 
Opening effects and Tokyo Lunch time effects, and then proceeded to examine the 
dynamics of volatility clustering and other properties. These patterns will be reexamined 
in this paper with the data of better quality to be explained below.     
 
All of the above-mentioned papers use the indicative quotes. This paper establishes the 
intraday patterns with “firm” (transactable) quotes and deals.  Since they are direct 
observation of trading activities, results are much more reliable than those with 
indicative prices. There are only several papers that use the firm quotes, such as 
Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (1996) and Goodhart and Payne (1996). But their data consist 
of only one week of observations. Closest studies that used almost same data set are 
Berger, et al. (2005) and Chaboud, et al. (2004). Berger et al. (2005) showed the 
positive correlations between order flows and exchange rate movement. They examined 
whether the exchange rate appreciates if there are more buyer initiated trades (deals 
where the ask quotes were hit by buyers), and found that an excess of buyer-initiated 
trades is associated with a rising price.   
 
It is known that macroeconomic statistical releases (announcements) sometimes move 
the exchange rate.  Ito and Roley (1987) was the first to examine effects of surprise 
components in macroeconomic announcements both from the United States and Japan 
on the intra-day movement of the yen/dollar exchange rate. More recently, many papers 
have been written with improved data sets.  Ansersen and Bollerslev (1998) and 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) examined the effect of macroeconomic 
announcement as well as intra-daily patterns of volatility, although both of them used 
the Reuters indicative quotes. Faust, et al. (2003), using high-frequency, but 
traditionally-available indicative quotes, studied the (joint) responses of the exchange 
rate, the interest rates and other asset prices at the time of macroeconomic 
announcements. They showed that a better than expected announcement in the US leads 
                                                  
17 Hsieh (1988) was one of the first papers that tried to characterize the exchange rate behavior. In 
the mid-1980s, the daily data of the exchange rates were considered to be high enough frequency.     
  9to the dollar appreciation, with lower relative risk premium for foreign currency or with 
expected future dollar depreciation.  The finding was consistent with Dornbusch 
“overshooting.” A similar study of effects of macroeconomic announcements was 
conducted with the EBS data set by Chaboud, et al. (2004). They associated the surge of 
trades and volatility to the macroeconomic announcements and other institutional 
features. Then, they established that the exchange rate responded to macroeconomic 
announcements very quickly, and the data releases tended to raise trading volumes, 
whether or not the content of the release was in line with expectation. They interpreted 
this as evidence of additional dimension of the data release beyond the surprise 
component that is associated with interpretation of the announcement, which takes time 
and actual trade.  The exchange rate jumpd within a few minutes when the data 
announcement contained the surprise component. Again, the stronger than expected data 
was found to appreciate the currency, as was found in Andersen, et al. (2003) and Faust, 
et al. (2003). Andersen, et al. argued that the market reacts to news in an asymmetric 
way, namely “bad news has greater impact than good news.”     
 
3.2. Definition of Activity during the day 
In this section, the hourly changes in the market activities, the bid-ask spread and the 
volatility are examined. As for market activities, we will take the number of price 
changes (the number of seconds where price changes are recorded) and the number of 
deals (the sum of bid-side deals and ask-side deals) in each hour of the day, averaged 
over a particular period (mostly over a year) with a differentiation of the standard and 
daylight saving time.
18 Similarly, the hourly bid-ask spread is averaged over the period 
(e.g., for one year).  The volatility is defined as the average absolute 1-minute return 
for each one-hour interval.  The 1-minute return is the change in the log of the 
mid-point of bid-ask quotes from minute s-1 to that of minute s, where minute s is 
defined as the s minute 00 second.    These indicators of market activities are calculated 
for each GMT Hour (Hour 0 to 23), and then averaged over a certain period (mostly 
over a year). . 
 
We also use the relative volume share of an hour, which is defined as hourly aggregated 
relative volumes in that day. The hourly trading volumes measured in the aggregate 
                                                  
18 Note that the number of price changes and the number of deals in the data set may not exactly 
match the total number of price changes and deals in the EBS system, because the data set is in terms 
of the one-second slice. If there are more price changes and deals within one second, the recorded 
numbers are less than the true numbers. The original data set is by second. Therefore, the maximum 
number of deals or price changes in one hour is 3,600.      
  10deals in the numbers of contracts divided by the total trading volume (the number of 
contracts) of the day.
19    
 
The difference between the deal count and the trading volume share is two fold. The 
deal count is the number of seconds in which there is one deal or more. Therefore a 
second that experienced the deal may contain more than one deal and one deal may 
mean one million US dollars or several millions of US dollars. The trading volumes are 
the total amount of deals, but expressed in the share within the day. 
 
A higher level of activities means frequent price changes, a larger number of deals, and 
a large number of trading volumes. The number of price changes by dealers tends to 
increase when more (heterogeneous) participants are in the market; when more news 
such as macroeconomic statistical announcements, become available; when the most 
competitive participant (who posts best bid and ask) is reacting to news and digest 
them; and when the bids and asks are hit more often (so that the best bids or asks are 
knocked out). The number of deals tends to increase when more participants with 
different expectations are present in the market (so that someone sells while someone 
buys at the same price); and when more news that can be interpreted differently become 
available to the market. 
 
The bid-ask spread tends to become narrower when more participants are in the market 
(that is, market is deep) and when expectations for the changes in the following seconds 
are relatively homogeneous.   
 
3.3. Standard Time and Daylight Saving Time 
Since daylight saving time is adopted in London and in New York, the GMT hours 
corresponding to the local business hours of London and New York shift by one hour 
during their respective summer season.  Table 3 summarizes the GMT hours and 




In the following, one year is divided into the two periods:
20  
                                                  
19 On “contract” is one million of the base currency. For the case of the USD/JPY 
contract, the one million dollar contract is bought and sold. 
20 Daylight saving time in 1999 was from April 4 to October 31 in the United States; from March 28 
  11 
Daylight Saving (Summer) Time: First Sunday of April-last Sunday of October,   
 
Standard (Winter) Time: January-last Sunday of March, the next working day of the   
last Sunday of October-December. 
 
Note that we eliminate from the sample the one-week period in the spring when Europe 
is under the Summer Time but the US is not. Also excluded from the sample are 




3.4. Intraday Activity Patterns 
Price changes and Deals 
Figures 1 and 2 show the intraday (Hour 0-23) pattern of the activities, the bid-ask 
spread and the volatility of the USD-JPY pair and Figures 3 and 4 show those of the 
Euro-USD pair. In the Figures, the return volatility is plotted by scaling 500 times the 
actual USD-JPY volatility and 400 times the actual Euro-USD volatility, in order to 
make them comparable in one Figure. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 reveal several interesting features.  First, a high correlation between 
the “number of price changes” and the “number of deals” is found in the yen-dollar 
foreign exchange market.  Second, there are three peaks in the number of price 
changes and the number of deals in a day.  In summer, peaks of the activity of 
USD-JPY pair are seen at Hour 0, Hours 6-7 and Hours 12-14; and in winter, Hour 0, 
Hour 8, and Hours 13-15.  We also find three troughs in a day. In summer: Hour 3; 
Hours 10-11; and Hour 21: and in winter, Hour 3, Hour 11, and Hour 22.    Third, there 
is a significant jump in activities at GMT Hour 0, or 9:00 a.m. Tokyo from Hour 23 of 
previous day, corresponding to the opening of the Tokyo foreign exchange market.  
                                                                                                                                                  
to October 31 in the United Kingdom; in 2000, from April 2 to October 29 in the United States, and 
from March 26 to October 29 in the United Kingdom; and in 2001, from April 1 to October 28 in the 
United States and from March 25 to October 28 in the United Kingdom. 
21 We drop the following holidays in addition to weekend days: for Christmas, December 30-January 
2; plus the Japanese national holidays, i.e.,Coming-of-Age Day, National Foundation Day, Vernal 
Equinox Day, Greenery Day, Constitution Day, Children's Day, Marine Day, Respect-for-the Aged 
Day, Autumnal Equinox Day, Sports Day, Culture Day, Labor Thanksgiving Day, The Emperor's 
Birthday; for UK, St Patrick's Day, Good Friday, Easter, Easter Monday, Spring Bank Holiday, 
Summer Bank Holiday, Boxing Day (St Stephen's Day for Roman Catholics); and for US, Martin 
Luther King Day, President’s Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, 
Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day. 
  12Fourth, the bid-ask spread is narrower during the first half of the day, then it becomes 
wider after Hours 16-17 and peaks at Hours 21-22.    Fifth, volatility moves very closely 
with market activities.    Volatility also shows a jump at GMT Hour 0. It is smaller when 
market activities are less and higher when market is active. 
 
In general, the bid-ask spread tends to be negatively correlated with the number of deals, 
the number of price changes and volatility: The three troughs of the number of deals (or 
price changes) mostly correspond to three peaks of the bid-ask spread. One slight 
exception is the Hour 0, when the bid-ask spread is higher than other business hours in 
Tokyo (except lunch hour at Hour 3) but the number of deals (or price changes) is at the 
one of the peaks; that is, unlike other times, a positive correlation. This will be 
examined in next section in details.     
 
The literature, as surveyed in section 3.1., is divided in predicting lower or higher 
bid-ask spread in the first hour of trading, and the correlation of spread and volatility or 
volume.  The picture clearly shows that the largest bid ask spread appears when the 
market activity is extremely low, namely, mid afternoon to evening of New York, GMT 
18 to 22 hours. During more active hours, the bid-ask spread is higher in hours when the 
activities are low, namely the Tokyo lunch hour and London lunch hour. The bid-ask 
spread is narrowest when the market is busiest, the overlapping business hours of 
London and New York.  Hsieh and Kleidon (1996) presented the intra-day U-shape 
pattern of the bid-ask spread of each regional dealers (London and New York).  They 
associate the dealers’ region as the identity of banks that put in the indicative quotes.  
However, they may represent not ready to transact quotes, basically the quotes that may 
be indicative of not active hours of that region.  In the best transactable quotes like 
EBS bids and asks, the U-shape is not observable. The peak in the globally non-active 
hours, 18 to22 GMT hours, have the unambiguously high bid-ask spreads.   
 
Figures 1 and 2 
 
The decrease in activities during the Tokyo lunch hour is remarkable. There used to be 
regulations that prohibited the interbank foreign exchange trading during the lunch hour 
in Tokyo.    Although the regulation was lifted in December 1994, the tradition seems to 
continue—history seems to matter.
22   
                                                  
22 Historically, the interbank foreign exchange transactions had a lunch break (regulatory shutdown) 
during the lunch hours.    When the regulation was removed, the activities during the lunch hour 
  13 
Figures 3 and 4 show hourly-aggregated Euro-USD activities that correspond to the 
earlier figures for the USD-JPY pair.  Similar observations emerge. First, a high 
correlation between the “number of price changes” and the “number of deals” is found.   
Second, as for the number of price changes and deals, three peaks on the hours similar 
to those of the USD-JPY pair, in a day are found, with one distinctive feature. The 
height of the first peak, Hour 0, is much lower for the Euro-USD pair than the USD-JPY. 
It is remarkable that during the peak hours in the London morning and the overlapping 
hours of London afternoon and New York morning, the number of deals (the sum of 
those on the bid and ask sides) exceeds that of price changes. This is evidence that the 
market is thick enough that many deals did not result in the price change. Third, we find 
three troughs in a day: at Tokyo lunch hour, London lunch hour, and at Hour 21-22.  
Fourth, the bid-ask spread is narrow during the London business hours. It becomes 
wider after Hours 16-17 and peaks at Hours 21-22.     
 
Figures 3 and 4 
 
In sum, comparing the USD-JPY and Euro-USD tradings, intraday activities of the two 
currency pairs show very similar patterns, with the following notable exceptions. First, 
there seems to be a “home-market advantage”.   That is, activities of the Tokyo market 
relative to the London market are higher for the USD-JPY and lower for the Euro-USD. 
In fact, the heights of the three peaks for the yen are roughly equal, but, for the euro, the 
height of the peak during the Tokyo opening hour is distinctively low. The Tokyo 
market (or to be precise, the Asian market in general) is not significant in the euro 
trading. Second, the Euro-USD market is particularly deep in London morning and even 
deeper in the London afternoon hours that overlap with the New York morning.  This 
is shown in the number of deals exceeding the number of price change during London 
business hours. Such a characteristics is not generally observed in the USD-JPY trading 
(only once at Hour 8 in the 1999-2001 summer).   
 
It is clearly seen from the Figures above, the correlation between bid-ask spreads and 
volatility is negative in the FOREX markets, which is completely opposite to the 
volatility pattern in equity markets.  In equity markets, the correlation between spread 
                                                                                                                                                  
increased at the expense of those before and after; the net effect was higher.    See Ito, Lyons, and 
Melvin (1998) and Covrig and Melvin (2005).    Then, in the afternoon and market-ending hours of 
Tokyo market, activity again increases in terms of relative transaction volume: it peaks around Hours 
5-6. 
  14and volatility is positive. When the market is volatile, the spreads tend to become wider.     
Dufour and Engle (2000), for example, find a positive correlation between volatility and 
spread for all 18 stocks used in the analysis.  Engle and Patton (2004), using 100 
NYSE stocks, also show that the active trades increase spreads.  In equity markets, 
volume and volatility move together, and the activities show a U shaped with rising at 
the end of the day as well as the beginning, and spreads are highest in the morning with 
a slight rise at the end of the day.   
 
Trade volume 
The above analysis is based on counts of deals and quote changes for the specific time 
interval. In the price data set, we cannot attribute the activities to specific locations (or, 
to be precise, market participants in the region).  An example is whether a surge in 
activities in the Tokyo mid-afternoon hours and London morning hours can be 
attributable to activities of the Tokyo participants or the London participants. 
Fortunately, the data set of the trading volume shares has the label of participants 
(regional names) for the trading shares.
23  
 
The relative trading volume shares of deals that can be attributable to participants of a 
particular region for the USD-JPY pair are shown in Figures 5 and 6.    The volumes of 
yen trades done by Tokyo financial institutions and London financial institutions clearly 
show the U-shape patterns, respectively, whereas yen trade by New York financial 
institutions shows a single peak pattern.  The peak of volume shares by the Tokyo 
participant (Hour 0) is higher than that by the London participants (Hours 7-8) or that 
by the New York participants (Hours 14-15).    Tokyo participants remain in the market, 
although with low shares, during the London and New York business hours.  The 
Tokyo participants start to trade the yen in the 7am Tokyo time (Hour 22), although a 
sudden surge at 9am is quite remarkable.    The trading volume share by Tokyo financial 
institutions at 8am (Hour 23) is higher than that during the London business hours.  
The New York peak volume share is higher than that of the London volume share (Hour 
12-13).  The London and New York participants are quite dormant in the yen trading 
during the London business hours.
24  
 
                                                  
23 Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) argue that it is the number of transactions, and not the size that 
cause the volatility using the stock market data. We have two measures, the counts of deals and the 
trading volume share. Both measures are highly correlated in our data set.   
24 The data set we used in our earlier study, Ito and Hashimoto (2004), did not distinguish the 
regional origins of the deals, and therefore the regional attribution remains only a conjecture.   
  15Figures 5 and 6 
 
Figures 7 and 8 show the relative trading volume shares for the EURO-USD pair. It is 
immediately clear that the share of euro trades by the Tokyo participants is quite small. 
Although there is a U-shape pattern in the euro trading by the Tokyo participants, the 
shape and height of the U-shape is quite different from that for the yen-dollar trading.  
The Tokyo participants’ share of Euro trading compared to that of the yen-dollar trading 
is low, and unlike the yen-dollar trading, the euro-dollar trading show that the trading 
share in the late afternoon hours (Hour 7 in the summer, Hour 6 in the winter) is higher 
than that of the beginning of the market (Hour 0). This shows that, for the euro trade, 
the Tokyo participants have to wait for London participants to find counterparties, 
whereas they can find among themselves the trading counterparties for the yen trade.  
In other words, for the yen-dollar trades, the Tokyo market has new information 
becoming available and heterogeneous reactions to the news generate trading, but for 
the euro trades, the Tokyo market relatively lacks news or has homogeneous 
participants.  
 
Figures 7 and 8 
 
The trading shares of the London participants are particularly high for the euro market 
during the two peaks (Hours 8 and 13-15 in winter; Hours 7 and 12-13 in summer).  
The trading shares of the New York participants show only a single peak (Hour 15 in 
winter and Hour 14 in summer).  For the euro-dollar trading, the London participants’ 
peak is higher than the New York participants’ peak, while for the yen-dollar trading, 
the peak of the London participants’ share is lower than the New York participants’ 
share during the overlapping hours (Hours 13-15). Even for the euro trading, the 
London and New York participants are almost non-existent in the Tokyo business hours.   
 
In sum, the trading volume share data show the following five salient features. First, a 
U-shape intra-day activity pattern is confirmed for the Tokyo and London market 
participants, but not for the New York market participants.
25 The lack of a U-shape 
activity for New York market participants is a new finding in the microstructure 
literature.
26 Second, there is a home-market bias in the foreign exchange market: the 
                                                  
25    The U-shape pattern was originally documented for the stock market. In the exchange market, 
see Hsieh and Kleidon (1996), and Ito, Lyons, and Melvin (1998). 
26    For the empirical test and survey of the U-Shape pattern in financial markets, see Harris (1986), 
Foster and Viswanathan, (1993), Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998), and Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). 
  16activity share for the yen trading is the highest by the Tokyo participants at the opening 
hours of the Tokyo market, while for the euro trading, the highest is by London 
participants during the overlapping hours of London afternoon and New York morning.   
Third, the relative trading share of the Tokyo market participants for the euro trading is 
significantly lower than the London or New York participants even in their peak hour.  
Fourth, the London and New York participants are quite dormant in their trading during 
the Tokyo market hours, while the Tokyo participants maintain some trading activities 
during the London business hours, both for the yen and euro trading.    Fifth, comparing 
the number of seconds that include at least one deal (Figures 1 through 4) and the 
volume shares (aggregate of three regional participants, or a vertical sum of three points 
for each hour in Figures 5 to 8) quite similar patterns are found. Three peaks during the 
day for the yen-dollar trading, and two high peaks and one low peak for the euro-dollar 
trading.   
 
 
4. Tests of Intra-day Seasonality Patterns   
The number of market participants varies from one day to next, and from one hour to 
next within the day.  There are conventional wisdoms regarding the depth of the 
market, market activities, and the bid-ask spread.   When many market participants are 
participating in the market, the market is commonly called deep. When many 
participants with very different background and forecasts are present in the market, 
deals tend to occur.  When there are many participants in the market, spreads tends to 
be narrower and trades do not change the best quotes.  These common senses can be 




4.1 Hypotheses   
Here, several hypotheses regarding intra-day patterns, such as the opening hour effects 
of the three markets, the Monday morning effect, and a (lack of) U-shape pattern are 
examined. The switch between the winter time and the daylight saving time will be 
exploited to identify opening hour effects of the London and NY markets apart from the 
GMT hour effects. (This cannot be done for the Tokyo opening effect, which is not 
distinguishable from the GMT Hour 0 dummy.)  Also a hypothesis that the bid-ask 
                                                  
27 Osler (2005) explained that when stop-loss orders are triggered the one-way movement of the 
exchange rate may result. This suggests that the relationship among volatility, volume and spread 
may change when the exchange rate changes per certain time period exceeds a threshold. However, 
we have not explored the possibility of nonlinear relationship.   
  17spread is narrower (wider) when the activity is higher (lower, respectively) is tested 
formally. 
 
It is expected that the bid-ask spread is positively correlated with market activities. 
When many participants are present in the market, then the price changes will be 
frequent, and at the same time, spreads will become narrower. For the hours where the 
spreads are narrower, number of deals becomes high, because the difference in the 
opinion between the most bullish buyer and the most bearish seller is slim.  When the 
bid-ask spread is small, a little perturbation in expectation or an arrival of small piece of 
information would trigger deals.    Thus, the following relationships will be examined.   
  
 
Spread(t) = a0 + a1*Number of price changes(t) +ε(t) , 
 
Number of deals(t) = b0 + b1* Spread(t)+ ε(t).
 
We hasten to add that both the RHS and LHS variables have the same time segments, 
and endogeneity is not exactly dealt with properly.     
 
However, there may be an exception to this relationship. When the Tokyo market opens 
after a long break, such as a weekend, the bid-ask spread may be wider because market 
participants are unsure about the market conditions and other participants’ positions, 
while the numbers of deals and quote revisions may be higher, as some participants 
have to carry out some accumulated orders from customers.   
 
4.2 Are Tokyo Opening Hours Special? 
First of all, let us test whether the opening hour of the Tokyo market has special 
characteristics, because it follows a few hours of extremely low activity. The 
relationship between bid-ask spread and the number of price changes and the 
relationship between the number of deals and the bid-ask spread are assumed to have a 
stable relationship throughout the day, possibly except for the first business hour of the 
Tokyo market. Then the model for testing the Hour0 effect is specified as follows: 
 
Spread(t) = a0 + (a1+ a2H0dum)*Number of price changes(t)+ε(t) , 
Number of deals(t) = b0 + (b1+ b2H0dum)* Spread(t)+ ε(t).
 
  18where H0dum is an hour 0 dummy, taking the value 1 when the quote is recorded in the 
period of Hour 0 (Tokyo 9am) and 0 otherwise. As explained above, it is supposed that 
the spread becomes narrower if a large number of dealers participate in the market, 
namely a large number of price changes, namely a1 <0, but this effect is weakened on 
the Hour 0, namely a2 < 0.  Similarly, if the spread is narrower, then there is a greater 
chance for deals, b1 < 0. If there is a pent-up orders to be executed in Tokyo at 9 am, 
after a hiatus of a few hours, then the H0 Dummy should have a positive impact on the 
trade, namely lessen the relationship between the spread and the deals. They are willing 
to trade even if the transactions costs, bid-ask spread, is high. This hypothesis is 
represented as b2 > 0.  During the opening hours of Tokyo (or Monday opening hours 
of Tokyo), the above relationship may be weakened and sign of dummy coefficients is 
expected to be positive.  In the right hand side of the equations, a lagged dependent 
and independent variables are included  Estimation results are shown in Table 4-1 
(USD-JPY pair) and in Table 4-2 (EURO-USD pair). Panel A of tables shows the 
regression results of spread and price changes, and Panel B shows the results of deals 
and spread. A separate regression is conducted for each of the three years.   
 
Table  4-1   Table  4-2 
 
As for the USD-JPY trade, shown in table 4-1, the statistically significant and negative 
coefficients of a1 and b1, as expected, are found.    That is, when market is deep, that is, 
when the number of price changes is large, the bid-ask spread tends to be narrower, and 
when the spread is narrow, the number of deals  is  large.  However, as shown in Panel A 
of Table 4-1, the H0dum is not estimated significantly positive. Instead, the results 
shows that the negative relationship between spread and the number of price changes  
is strengthened for USD-JPY during the Tokyo opening hours.  In contrast, Panel B 
shows a positive and significant estimated H0 dummy. That is, even with a wider spread, 
market participants tend to deal during the Tokyo opening hours. This evidence is not 
consistent with Admati and Pfeiderer but consistent with Foster and Viswanathan (1990, 
1993) in the case of the stock market.     
 
The result for the Euro-USD trade is almost the same as is the case with the yen-dollar 
trade. In Table 4-2, a predicted negative relationship between number of price change 
and spread and between deals and spread is found. As shown in Panel A of Table 4-2, 
the Tokyo opening hour effect is not found between spread and price changes, except 
year 2001.    However, between spread and deals, the Tokyo opening hour effect is seen 
  19as in Panel B of Table 4-2.   
 
The hypothesis of a special first hour effect, a positive correlation between the spread 
and activities—namely, the Tokyo opening effect, is not supported in spread and price 
changes relationship, but strongly seen between spread and deals.  Deals  are  done  even 
with a wider spread during the Tokyo opening hours.     
 
4.3 Does Monday Opening Effect exist in the FX market? 
It is also worth checking the Monday morning effect because Tokyo market opens for 
the first time of the week after a long weekend break.    If orders accumulated during the 
weekend (about 35 hours) is much larger than those accumulated during the overnight 
gap (2-3 hours) between New York close and Tokyo open, then the first hour of Tokyo 
on Monday (Hour 0 in adjusted GMT) may be different, most likely with a much higher 
activity, from that hour on any other day of the week.     
 
Here, the effect of Monday morning is examined using the Monday Hour 0 dummy in 
the following regression model:   
 
Spread(t) = a0 + (a1+ a2MonH0dum)*number of price changes(t)+ε(t), 
Number of deals(t) = a0 + (b1+b2MonH0dum)* spread(t)+ε(t).
 
MonH0dum takes 1 when the price changes (deals) is put in at Monday Hour 0 and 0 
otherwise. The expected sign of coefficient a1 (b1) is negative, and that of MonH0dum is 
positive. Again, lagged dependent and independent variables are also included in each 
of regressions. 
 
Table  4-3   Table  4-4 
 
Overall, the results suggest the existence of Tokyo opening effect (H0 dummy) and 
Monday opening effect (Monday H0 dummy) for both USD-JPY and Euro-USD deals. 
That is, market participants carry out orders even with relatively wider bid-ask spread 
during the Tokyo opening hours.  However, we do not find strong opening effects in 
price changes.   
 
As seen in Panel B of tables 4-1 and 4-3, coefficients of b1+b2 are strictly positive for 
USDJPY trades, as b1＜０＜b2 and |b1|<|b2| .    In Hour 0 (Tokyo opening hour), unlike 
  20other hours, the wider spread induces more deals, and this is more so on Monday, as the 
difference |b2|-|b1| is larger in Panel 4-3-B than Panel 4-1-B.    A remarkable reversal of 
the sign of coefficient is found in the relationship between deals and spread for the 
USD-JPY transactions during the Tokyo opening hour, and in particular on Mondays.   
 
In contrast, it is clear from Panel B of Tables 4-2 and 4-4 that for EUR-USD transaction, 
the b1+b2 remains negative, as is b1, although b2>0 is common to the case of Tables 4-1 
and 4-3 (USD-JPY). Therefore, a large number of price changes raises spreads to some 
extent, and a number of deals increases even a wider spread during the Tokyo opening 
hours/Monday opening hours, although the negative correlation holds between spread 
and deals for EUR-USD transactions. 
 
 
5. London and New York opening effects 
Finally, we test the effect of opening hours of London and New York markets using one 
of the following specifications:   
 
y(t) = β*D1 + γ*D2 +ε(t), 
 
where y is one of the three variables, number of price changes, the number of deals, or 
the bid-ask spread; and D1 and D2 are dummy vectors. The relative volume is included 
as an explanatory variable to represent the depth of the market. D1 consists of dummy 
variables representing Hour 0 to Hour 23 to control the hour of the day effects. D2 are 
dummy vectors that examine opening and lunch hours over and above the GMT hour 
effect, as will be explained below. Opening hours of London and New York can be 
identified separately from the GMT hour dummies because the opening hour shifts by 
one hour between summer and winter. Since the Tokyo market does not observe the 
daylight saving time, the Tokyo local time does not shift against GMT hour, and 
therefore we use the dummy vector D2 that identifies the London opening, London 
lunch, and New York opening over and above k hours after the Tokyo opens regardless 
of the daylight saving time. Here, D2 can be written as follows: 
 
  21D =  2 
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1





The D2 variables include the following open and lunch hour dummy variables. For 
example, as lunch breaks in London seem to begin at GMT Hour 10 in summer and 
MT Hour 11 in winter, the London lunch dummy takes the following expression: 
    
n winter 
           0   o t h e r w i s e .  
don lunch (London opening, NY opening) over and above the GMT Hour 
ffect.
28   
ng with 
 London lunch time. Therefore, the London opening dummy takes the form: 
  
 winter 
               0   o t h e r w i s e .  
r the case where the 
ondon market opens at Hour 6 in summer and Hour 7 in winter.   
                                                 
G
 
              1   a t   H o u r   1 0   i n   s u m m e r
LN lunch =          1 at Hour 11 i
       
  




In running regressions, opening hours of two major markets are considered alo
the
  
                1   a t   H o u r   7   i n   s u m m e r  
LDN open 1 =          1 at Hour 8 in
     
 
Since a large jump of quote entries between hour 5 and hour 6 in summer (which 
corresponds to the London 5 and 6 hour in the morning) and between hour 6 and hour 7 
in winter is in some cases found in Figures 2-1 to 2-4, we conside
L
 
28 The test is conducted including three other sets of dummies: London opening(version 2) = 1 at 
Hour 6 in summer, 1 at Hour 7 in winter, and 0 otherwise; NY open (version 2)= 1 at Hour 14 in 
summer, 1 at Hour 15 in winter, and 0 otherwise; NY open (version 3)= 1 at Hour 13 in summer, 1 at 
Hour 14 in winter, and 0 otherwise. The results are not reported to save space, but it is found that 
each of the London opening, London lunch, and NY opening has a significant effect on both price 
changes and spread, and that the opening (lunch) hours significantly shift with the daylight saving 
time. 
  22 
  
 winter 
               0   o t h e r w i s e ,  
ur, and 
erefore we consider three types of the New York opening dummies as follows: 
    
n winter 
             0   o t h e r w i s e ,  
    
n winter 
             0   o t h e r w i s e ,  
    
n winter 
                0   o t h e r w i s e ,  
 
                1   a t   H o u r   6   i n   s u m m e r  
LDN open 2 =          1 at Hour 7 in
     
 
It is not exactly clear from the Figures which hour is the New York opening ho
th
 
              1   a t   H o u r   1 4   i n   s u m m e r
NY open 1 =        1 at Hour 15 i
     
 
              1   a t   H o u r   1 3   i n   s u m m e r
NY open 2 =        1 at Hour 14 i
     
 
              1   a t   H o u r   1 2   i n   s u m m e r
NY open 3 =        1 at Hour 13 i
Regression results 
Regression results for the USD-JPY pair are shown in Table 5-1. Panel A shows the 
result of Number of Price Changes. The results generally show that the Hour dummy 
variables are significant most of the time.  The London open dummies, London lunch 
dummy, and New York open dummies are all significant and positive.  The results 
indicate that the London opening effect and New York opening effect, after controlling 
for the GMT Hour effect and the trading volume effect, are clearly identified. The 
number of price changes are estimated approximately 25-30% larger during opening 
hours than other business hours. The London lunch dummy is estimated significantly 
egative as expected.   
ected signs.  The number of deals 
ecomes 35-43% larger during the opening hours.   
n
 
The middle panel summarizes regression results of the number of deals. The GMT hour 
effects are significant, and the opening hours of London and New York as well as 
London Lunch hours are significant and have exp
b
 
  23The bottom panel shows the regression result of the spread. Results show that the GMT 
hour dummy variables as well as London Lunch effect are significant in all of the 
regressions, whereas London and New York opening effects are insignificant in 2000 
and 2001. The spread is estimated more than 3% narrower during the opening hours. In 
particular, it drops by more than 6% during New York opening hours.  The opening 
hour effects are significantly negative in 1999, indicating that the spread becomes 
narrower at the beginning of London and New York markets.    However, coefficients of 
opening are found insignificant in 2000 and in 2001. This suggests that it is difficult to 
infer from the movement of the spread when the London and New York market opens in 
2000 and 2001.  The width of spread is not significantly different from other hours 
even during the opening hours of London and New York.  Contrary to the opening 
hour effects, London lunch hour is estimated significantly positive in all regressions. 





Regression results of the Euro-USD pair are shown in Table 5-2. The result of 
regression of the Number of Price Changes is provided in the upper panel. The results 
show that the Hour dummy variables, as well as the London open dummies, London 
nch dummy and New York open dummies are significant.     
f the Number of Deals.    All of the 
oefficients are significant and have expected signs. 
nt from other business hours even during the 





The middle panel in Table 5-2 provides the results o
c
 
The result of Bid-ask Spread is summarized in the bottom panel. Although the Hour 
dummies are all significant, London and New York opening dummies and London lunch 
dummies are insignificant in most cases. In contrast to the result of USD-JPY pair, the 
width of spread is not significantly differe
o
 
Both the lack of the upswing of the U-shape in the afternoon for the trading activities 
and the insignificant market open effects on bid-ask spread in New York market may be 
due to the recent widespread practice of continuous trading and better control of 
inventory. The U-shape, in particular the increase in the afternoon, is often regarded as 
  24willingness to trade in order to control inventory ahead of a long break (between the 
days or over the weekend).  However, the widespread use of the trading systems like 
the EBS system and the computer programs made it much easier for dealers and 
proprietary traders to find market rates and counterparties even in other regions of the 
world regardless of the local hours and to manage inventories continuously. This may 
have contributed to the disappearance of the pick up of the activities toward the end of 
the business hours in New York, and little changes of the bid-ask spread during the 
usiness hours from Tokyo, London, and New York.
29    b
 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, the intra-daily patterns were investigated from the rich data sets of EBS 
quotes, deals and relative trading shares. Some of the findings are well-known such as 
the high activities at the opening of the market, high correlations between quote entries 
and deals, and higher activities being associated with narrow spreads.    However, some 
of the findings are somewhat surprising.  The following observations are new in the 
terature. 
on hours.  Even on 
ridays, there is no pick up in activities in the NY afternoon hours. 
ps during the lunch hours in 
okyo and, to the lesser extent, in European lunch hours.   
MT Hour 0) has a slightly wider spread than other 
                                                 
li
 
First, there is no U-shape intraday activity pattern in the dollar/yen or euro/dollar 
market in New York market.  The activities are high during the opening hours but not 
ending hours. Careful observations on the peak of activities, exploiting the difference 
between Tokyo and New York in adoption of summer (daylight saving) and winter time 
to conclude where the activities originate during the overlapping business hours. There 
is no surge in activities toward the end of the New York afterno
F
 
Second, intra-day patterns of activities and bid-ask spreads are quite stable over the time 
(yearly comparison). Namely, the peak of activities is observed in the opening hours 
(9am in Tokyo; 8am in Europe/7am London, and 8-10am New York), and the troughs 
are late afternoon hours of New York, with significant dro
T
 
Third, the bid-ask spread is generally negatively correlated with the indicator of 
activities: Higher activities are associated with narrow spreads and low activities are 
associated with wide spreads.  However, the first hour, or to be more specific the first 
half hour of the Tokyo market (G
 
29 We thank Rich Lyons for his suggestion of this interpretation. 
  25hours of comparable activities.     
 more than half of euro trades are attributable to the London 
nancial institutions.     
ions may have 
ifferent reactions to the same news, and resulting in the deal.   
 London lunch hour. These features are common 
etween the yen and the euro trading. 
tions) in addition to the 
rge change in prices during the overlapping business hours.   
 
Fourth, from observations of the figures, we found that a home-market bias in the 
foreign exchange market is significant.  The yen is traded more by Tokyo financial 
institutions (Tokyo-Tokyo deals, Tokyo-London deals, in particular) and the euro is 
traded more by London financial institutions (London-London deals, London-New York 




Fifth, it is interesting to know that the overlapping business hours encourage 
inter-regional transactions and overall surges in activities. For both the yen and the euro, 
the London-New York deal share is the highest, and the Tokyo-New York deal share is 
the lowest. This may reflect the fact that participants from other reg
d
 
Sixth, a rigorous analysis of the opening hour effects of London and New York, and 
lunch hour effects of London, taking advantage of the one-hour shift between the 
regular and daylight saving times, we find that there are significant opening hour surge 
and lunch hour decline in activities (the number of deals and the number of price 
changes).   However, there seems to be insignificant effects on the bid-ask spread from 
the London or New York openings or
b
 
Finally, a positive correlation between the price change and the inter-regional trading 
share was found for overlapping business hours between Tokyo and London, and also fo 
those between London and New York.  When information, both private and public, 
available in the newly-opening market (e.g., London) is quite different from that had 
been known in the previously trading market (e.g., Tokyo), then inter-regional trading 
becomes more prevalent (relative to total volumes of transac
la
 
Although we have found several interesting facts in the newly available data, there are 
many tasks left for future research.    First, changes in the exchange rate and an activity 
indicator may be correlated. If the deal is done on one side only, then the exchange rate 
may move toward that direction.  The price impact of deals will be investigated in the 
  26future.  Second,  macroeconomic  announcements are often planned during the hour that 
are before the market opening (say, 8:45 am).    However, other markets are open in the 
case of foreign exchange markets.  Additional activities on the day of announcements 
may be detected not in the market (say, NY) where it is announced but in other markets 
(say, London).   
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  31Table 1:    Data summary; Jan 1, 1999 – December 28, 2001 
(Excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and national holidays in at least one of the three major markets)   
（A）  Quote and Deal data for the USD-JPY pair 
Total number of seconds 
59,234,400
Quote 
    Number of Price changes  7,514,064






Number of deals 
bid-side only  2,746,195




（B）Quote and Deal data for Euro-USD pair 
Total number of seconds 
59,234,400
Quote 
    Number of Price changes  7,250,465
spread  mean 0.00014998
median 




Number of deals 
bid-side only  4,055,369
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Table 2: Relative deal amount by region in the EBS Market. 
(A)Relative volume for the USD-JPY pair 













Note: percentage of the total daily volume for the USD-JPY pair  
 
 
(B)Relative volume for the Euro-USD pair 













Note: percentage of the total daily volume for the EUR-USD pair 
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G M T 0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3
Tokyo 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 +0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8
L o n d o n 0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3
N Y - 1 9 - 2 0 - 2 1 - 2 2 - 2 30123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8
Daylight saving time (Summer)
G M T 0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3
Tokyo 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 +0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8
L o n d o n 123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 + 0
N Y - 2 0 - 2 1 - 2 2 - 2 30123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9
March-April 1 week  (Daylight saving time in London and Winter time in New York)
G M T 0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3
Tokyo 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 +0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8
L o n d o n 123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 + 0





















  34Table 4-1: Hour 0 Effect for USD-JPY trade 
Panel A: Correlation between Number of Price change and Spread   
Constant s.e. # of price change s.e. H0 Dummy s.e. NOB
Whole 7.21E-03 *** 1.68E-04 -6.16E-07 *** 2.39E-07 -1.76E-06 *** 3.31E-07 16453
1999 7.95E-03 *** 3.26E-04 -7.12E-07 * 4.38E-07 -1.65E-06 *** 5.68E-07 5321
2000 8.03E-03 *** 2.80E-04 -6.48E-07 * 4.05E-07 -2.28E-06 *** 5.71E-07 5590
2001 6.90E-03 *** 2.90E-04 -9.59E-07 *** 3.94E-07 -1.63E-06 *** 5.88E-07 5542
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
Panel B: Correlation between Number of Deals and Spread 
Constant s.e. spread s.e. H0 Dummy s.e. NOB
Whole 217.3 *** 6.7 -4885.94 *** 321.3 17432.6 *** 465.3 16453
1999 248.1 *** 13.5 -4782.55 *** 612.2 21343.6 *** 914.8 5321
2000 230.2 *** 10.9 -5466.97 *** 510.8 14458.3 *** 712.7 5590
2001 250.6 *** 11.1 -5364.02 *** 516.9 14437.8 *** 742.1 5542




Table 4-2 Hour 0 Effect for Euro-USD trade 
Panel A: Correlation between Number of Price change and Spread 
Constant s.e. # of price change s.e. H0 Dummy s.e. NOB
whole 1.55E-04 *** 2.17E-06 -7.38E-08 *** 4.86E-09 -2.02E-08 ** 1.14E-08 16444
1999 1.64E-04 *** 3.93E-06 -8.88E-08 *** 8.76E-09 -2.82E-08 * 1.88E-08 5319
2000 1.56E-04 *** 3.87E-06 -8.28E-08 *** 8.57E-09 -3.62E-08 * 2.16E-08 5586
2001 1.48E-04 *** 3.49E-06 -5.24E-08 *** 7.90E-09 5.16E-09 1.90E-08 5539
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Panel B: Correlation between Number of Deals and Spread 
Constant s.e. spread s.e. H0 Dummy s.e. NOB
whole 204.3 *** 6.0 -355176 *** 22087.0 261160 *** 64164.6 16444
1999 195.8 *** 10.0 -353696 *** 36292.5 308779 *** 102842 5319
2000 211.8 *** 10.3 -371868 *** 36702.6 169783 * 123447 5586
2001 209.6 *** 10.8 -344115 *** 42267.2 283027 *** 107947 5539









  35Table 4-3: Monday Opening effect for USD-JPY trade 
Panel A: Correlation between the Number of Price changes and spread.     
Constant s.e. # of price change s.e. MonH0 Dummy s.e. NOB
whole 6.50E-03 *** 1.68E-04 -2.27E-06 *** 2.21E-07 1.64E-05 *** 7.30E-07 16453
1999 7.10E-03 *** 3.27E-04 -2.68E-06 *** 4.01E-07 1.60E-05 *** 1.19E-06 5321
2000 7.42E-03 *** 2.82E-04 -2.21E-06 *** 3.80E-07 1.45E-05 *** 1.27E-06 5590
2001 6.10E-03 *** 2.92E-04 -2.24E-06 *** 3.69E-07 1.83E-05 *** 1.39E-06 5542
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Panel B: Correlation between Number of Deals and spread 
Constant s.e. spread s.e. MonH0 Dummy s.e. NOB
Whole 222.9 *** 7.0 -6618.2 *** 334.7 23085.5 *** 1138.9 16453
1999 244.8 *** 14.2 -6883.0 *** 640.4 29225.2 *** 2245.2 5321
2000 242.0 *** 11.2 -6930.6 *** 528.5 17659.8 *** 1653.6 5590
2001 264.0 *** 11.5 -6740.9 *** 537.2 17689.7 *** 1905.3 5542




Table 4-4: Monday Opening effect for Euro-USD trade 
Panel A: Correlation between the Number of Price changes and spread. 
Constant s.e. # of price change s.e. MonH0 Dummy s.e. NOB
whole 1.55E-04 *** 2.15E-06 -7.46E-08 *** 4.82E-09 -3.60E-08 * 2.58E-08 16444
1999 1.63E-04 *** 3.91E-06 -9.10E-08 *** 8.64E-09 -1.22E-08 4.24E-08 5319
2000 1.55E-04 *** 3.84E-06 -8.41E-08 *** 8.51E-09 -5.64E-08 4.84E-08 5586
2001 1.48E-04 *** 3.47E-06 -5.13E-08 *** 7.83E-09 -4.45E-08 4.28E-08 5539
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Panel B: Correlation between Number of Deals and spread 
Constant s.e. spread s.e. MonH0 Dummy s.e. NOB
whole 205.8 *** 6.0 -350216 *** 22058.0 328091 ** 159779 16444
1999 197.6 *** 10.0 -347997 *** 36263.1 342864 * 244451 5319
2000 213.2 *** 10.2 -370781 *** 36697.9 220876 295604 5586
2001 210.3 *** 10.8 -333859 *** 42077.9 416122 * 291152 5539










  36Table 5-1: London and New York markets Effects for USD-JPY pair 
Whole period 1999 2000 2001
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Number of price change
LNOPEN 173.85 *** 11.91 223.19 *** 22.96 124.06 *** 17.02 178.05 *** 19.65
LNOPEN2 175.34 *** 11.91 205.98 *** 22.96 129.56 *** 17.02 193.42 *** 19.65
NYOPEN 170.64 *** 12.01 238.40 *** 23.14 146.61 *** 17.16 128.22 *** 19.82
NYOPEN2 182.36 *** 12.74 247.34 *** 24.51 171.80 *** 18.20 128.57 *** 21.07
NYOPEN3 210.08 *** 12.01 239.25 *** 23.14 203.55 *** 17.16 187.57 *** 19.82
LNLUNCH -72.63 *** 11.23 -76.74 *** 21.68 -93.88 *** 16.04 -47.43 *** 18.49
Number of Deals
Whole period 1999 2000 2001
LNOPEN 243.81 *** 14.79 392.85 *** 32.86 154.17 *** 18.76 194.10 *** 20.83
LNOPEN2 225.78 *** 14.79 330.81 *** 32.86 148.57 *** 18.76 205.12 *** 20.83
NYOPEN 205.45 *** 14.91 343.16 *** 33.10 167.49 *** 18.91 111.30 *** 21.01
NYOPEN2 236.80 *** 15.82 407.08 *** 35.07 202.84 *** 20.07 106.94 *** 22.33
NYOPEN3 257.34 *** 14.91 381.94 *** 33.10 236.49 *** 18.91 158.84 *** 21.01
LNLUNCH -94.04 *** 13.94 -118.24 *** 31.02 -105.15 *** 17.68 -59.11 *** 19.60
Spread
Whole period 1999 2000 2001
LNOPEN -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0015 ** 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0002 0.0007
LNOPEN2 -0.0005 * 0.0004 -0.0014 ** 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0002 0.0007
NYOPEN -0.0006 * 0.0004 -0.0010 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0007
NYOPEN2 -0.0013 *** 0.0004 -0.0024 *** 0.0008 -0.0010 ** 0.0006 -0.0007 0.0007
NYOPEN3 -0.0014 *** 0.0004 -0.0026 *** 0.0008 -0.0011 ** 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0007
LNLUNCH 0.0024 *** 0.0004 0.0025 *** 0.0007 0.0020 *** 0.0005 0.0026 *** 0.0006
NOB 16454 5322 5590 5542
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
Table 5-2: London and New York markets Effects for Euro-USD pair 
Whole period 1999 2000 2001
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Number of price change
LNOPEN 132.45 *** 9.40 118.05 *** 15.82 88.91 *** 15.99 190.25 *** 16.12
LNOPEN2 192.02 *** 9.40 172.76 *** 15.82 148.63 *** 15.99 254.28 *** 16.12
NYOPEN 159.64 *** 9.48 124.68 *** 15.94 144.48 *** 16.12 209.52 *** 16.25
NYOPEN2 144.00 *** 10.06 93.41 *** 16.88 134.06 *** 17.10 204.33 *** 17.28
NYOPEN3 162.54 *** 9.48 133.90 *** 15.94 149.54 *** 16.12 204.49 *** 16.25
LNLUNCH -86.65 *** 8.86 -104.27 *** 14.93 -121.94 *** 15.07 -33.42 ** 15.16
Number of Deals
Whole period 1999 2000 2001
LNOPEN 362.30 *** 14.24 316.61 *** 23.76 300.50 *** 24.38 467.76 *** 24.23
LNOPEN2 310.31 *** 14.24 286.57 *** 23.76 245.09 *** 24.38 398.53 *** 24.23
NYOPEN 347.04 *** 14.35 294.98 *** 23.94 370.94 *** 24.58 371.55 *** 24.44
NYOPEN2 336.77 *** 15.23 278.06 *** 25.36 366.85 *** 26.08 362.24 *** 25.98
NYOPEN3 361.20 *** 14.35 304.40 *** 23.94 367.54 *** 24.58 408.96 *** 24.44
LNLUNCH -212.91 *** 13.42 -244.44 *** 22.43 -265.59 *** 22.98 -129.55 *** 22.80
Spread
Whole period 1999 2000 2001
LNOPEN -0.00001 * 0.00001 -0.00002 ** 0.00001 0.000000 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001
LNOPEN2 -0.00001 * 0.00001 -0.00002 ** 0.00001 -0.000001 0.00001 -0.000003 0.00001
NYOPEN -0.000004 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001 -0.000005 0.00001 0.000004 0.00001
NYOPEN2 0.000002 0.00001 -0.000002 0.00001 0.000002 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
NYOPEN3 -0.000005 0.00001 -0.000001 0.00001 -0.000003 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001
LNLUNCH 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.000001 0.00001
NOB 16449 5321 5587 5541





  37Figure 1: Intraday Activities (USD-JPY), Winter 1999-2001 
Statistics of activity, Winter 1999-2001































































Figure 2: Intraday Activities (USD-JPY), Summer 1999-2001 
Statistics of activity, Summer 1999-2001

































































  38Figure 3: Intraday Activities (Euro-USD), Winter 1999-2001 
Statistics of Activity (Euro-USD), Winter 1999-2001

















































Figure 4: Intraday Activities (Euro-USD), Summer 1999-2001 
Statistics of activity (Euro-USD), Summer 1999-2001

















































  39Figure 5: Relative volume (USD-JPY), Winter 1999-2001 







































Figure 6: Relative volume (USD-JPY), Summer 1999-2001 







































  40Figure 7: Relative volume (Euro-USD), winter 1999-2001 








































Figure 8: Relative volume(Euro-USD), summer 1999-2001 
Three Major Markets Traffic Pattern (EUR/USD)
1999-2001 summer
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